nginx2root: Five Flaws That Run Code on Your Server
Five nginx flaws let an attacker run code without authenticating. The worst, CVE-2026-123007, has been in the code since 2015 and asks for nothing more than HTTP/2 turned on: no PHP, no database, no backend.
What Happened on November 18
F5, the company behind nginx, shipped an out-of-band security release: stable jumps to 1.30.7 and mainline to 1.31.9. Among the ten fixed vulnerabilities, five come from the Xint team under the name nginx2root, and all five end in remote code execution with no credentials. AlmaLinux, Red Hat, Ubuntu, Plesk and the official Docker images published patched packages within hours.
nginx2root: Five in nginx and One More in the Kernel
The name describes the full chain. Xint linked the HTTP/2 flaw to a bug in Linux's SCTP module, present since 2018, to move from "code execution in the worker" to "root on the host". Important: updating nginx does not fix that last hop, it needs its own patch.
CVE-2026-123007: The Overflow That Starts in Flow Control
HTTP/2 uses windows to regulate how much each side may send. nginx keeps that accounting in an integer; with a specific sequence of frames the counter drops below zero (integer underflow), the size calculation blows up and the write lands outside the reserved buffer. The worker dies with a segmentation fault, and with ASLR off or bypassable that overflow stops being a crash and becomes control of execution.
Why a Static-File Server Is Exposed Too
The bug sits in the layer that processes connections, not in application code. Wiz confirmed code execution on stock 1.31.7 and 1.31.8 builds while serving responses from memory, with no upstream involved. With ASLR working and no address leak the attack stays a denial of service, which is why the 9.2 score F5 assigns describes the worst case, not what anyone gets from the internet in ten minutes.
The Other Four: Proxy, Resolver, QUIC and Mail
Use-After-Free When nginx Proxies
CVE-2026-123633 shows up on HTTP/2 when nginx sits in front of a backend and the worker runs out of worker_connections: it marks a connection reusable and closes it while the request is still alive. Affects 1.19.7 through 1.31.8. One discrepancy worth stating: nginx.org rates it medium, while F5 and Wiz put it at 9.2.
Resolver, QUIC and the Mail Proxy
CVE-2026-123634 is a resolver race that appears when you proxy_pass to names built from variables and also use SSI or mirror subrequests. CVE-2026-121810 is a use-after-free in HTTP/3 when a QUIC connection closes with a request still in flight. CVE-2026-113425 is another use-after-free, in the mail proxy: it only applies if you expose SMTP, IMAP or POP3.
Am I Exposed? Three Checks, in Order
One: Exact Version, Branch by Branch
This is where people get it wrong. 1.30.7 is fixed, but 1.31.0 through 1.31.8 are not: a check like "my version is greater than or equal to 1.30.7, I'm safe" clears a vulnerable 1.31.8. Compare against your branch advisory, not against a bare number.
Two: Is HTTP/2, HTTP/3 or the Mail Proxy Actually in Use?
Without HTTP/2 enabled, 123007 and 123633 are not reachable that way. Look at your listen blocks and the per-site includes, including whatever your control panel writes for you. No QUIC listeners means 121810 is out of reach too.
Three: Which Binary Is Really Running
nginx -v reports the compiled version of the binary in your PATH, which is not always the one the service runs. Cross-check against the live process and the package your distro installed.
Update and Restart: Why a Reload Is Not Enough
This is the detail that leaves servers "updated" and still vulnerable. nginx -s reload re-reads configuration, but the master process keeps the binary it loaded at startup; if the package on disk was replaced, the old one still answers. The service needs a restart. In containers, a tag pinned to an old build will not change by itself. NGINX Plus is affected as well: 37.x branches before the fixed builds and R34 through R36.
If You Cannot Patch Tonight: Mitigations and Their Cost
Removing http2 from listen, or setting http2 off where the directive exists, closes the path for 123007 and 123633. The cost is real: native gRPC depends on HTTP/2 and stops working, and clients lose multiplexing. For 121810, drop the QUIC listeners or disable HTTP/3. For 113425, bind the mail proxy to loopback or filter by IP. And block loading the kernel SCTP module if you do not use it: that is the hop that turns an nginx flaw into root on the host.
What Is Known About Exploitation (and What Is Not)
A public proof of concept exists for 123007, but in the lab it needs a huge volume of HTTP/2 traffic on a single connection to drive the underflow. As of this writing there is no confirmed exploitation in production and no CISA KEV entry. The 56.7 million hosts Shodan returned with nginx measure how popular the server is, not how many are victims.
Conclusion: This Week's Checklist
Check your version branch by branch, confirm HTTP/2 is in use, install the package and restart the service instead of reloading it. If you cannot do it today, turn HTTP/2 off and accept the cost. And do not forget the kernel: the nginx patch does not cover the SCTP hop. If you want to keep pace with this month's critical CVEs, the blog has been covering one a day.